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Wright: Trademark Law

NOTE
DON'T BE CRUEL:
SCOPE OF PARODY CURTAILED IN
ELVIS PRESLEY ENTERPRISES,
INC. v. CAPECE

I.

INTRODUCTION

Forty years ago, the "in-crowd" of American society experienced a unique phase. 1 Velvet paintings were coveted, lava
lamps were in every home, and bell-bottoms were the fashion of
the day. 2 In the words of one court, this era fostered a culture
obsessed with the fleeting and the unimportant, idolizing celebrities as if they were gods.3 In 1991, Barry Capece opened
The Velvet Elvis nightclub to satirize this materialistic, flashy
lifestyle. 4 Unfortunately, the humor of Capece's parody escaped Elvis Presley Enterprises, the heir to Elvis Presley's intellectual property rights, who sued Capece, alleging violation
of the entertainer's rights of publicity, federal trademark infringement, and dilution of its marks. 5

1. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Tex.
1996).
2. See id. at 788.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 789. See also TENN. CODE ANN. 47-25-1103 (1997). Tennessee law
establishes a property right for every individual in his or her name, photograph or
likeness in any medium. See TENN. CODE ANN. 47-25-1103. Such rights are
assignable, licensable, and do not expire upon the death of the individual. These rights
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Parody is a controversial form of artistic expression. 6
Courts often disagree as to the protection it should be afforded,
and define it differently based on the context in which it is being scrutinized. 7 Rather than providing clarity on the legal role
of parody, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Elvis Presley Enterprises v. Barry Capece,8 created further ambiguity in the area of trademark law.
This Note explores how the Fifth Circuit limited the legal
boundaries of parody in the context of trademark law. Section
II provides a background of trademark law and how parody fits
into a court's determination as to whether infringement has
occurred. Section III presents the facts and procedural history
of the case, including the district court's analysis. In Section
IV, this Note examines how the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
approached the application of parody in the trademark context.
Finally, Section V discusses the severe limitation on the legal
use of parody set forth by the Fifth Circuit, and offers an alternative approach to parody in the context of trademark law.

II.

BACKGROUND

Trademark law protects the public against confusion as to
the origin of products and services and protects the trademark
owner against misappropriation of his or her efforts to market
those goods or services. 9 To determine whether trademark infringement has occurred, courts apply the likelihood of confu-

of publicity are descendible to the executors, assigns, heirs, or devisees of the
individual. See id.
6. See NEW MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY FOR LARGE PRINT USERS (1989).
Parody is defined as "a humorous or satirical imitation." Id. See also Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994). In Campbell, the Court addressed the
defendant's parody defense under the fair use doctrine in a copyright infringement
situation. Writing for the Court, Justice Souter explained the Court's difficulty with
the controversial nature of parody as a form of artistic expression. He stated there is
no bright line rule for either parodist or judge as to when infringement has occurred
because each case must be judged based on the specific facts at hand. See id.
7. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. Justice Souter noted that for purposes of
copyright law, parody has a particular meaning. Thus, parody may be defined
differently when reviewing the concept in another area of law. See id.
8. 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
9. See infra notes 13-50 and accompanying text for a description of trademark
protection.
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sion test. 10 This test takes into account factors that may contribute to the likelihood of confusion between two marks, such
as similarity between the marks, intent of the alleged infringer,
and, when applicable, parody. 11 If the court fmds that infringement has occurred, the remedies available to the trademark owner are injunctive relief, an accounting for profits
when appropriate, and treble damages if the infringement was
willful. 12

A

TRADEMARK LAw

A trademark is a word, name, symbol or device used to identify the source of the products or services offered to the public. 13
Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 to protect trademarks used in national and foreign commerce.14 The Lanham
Act was founded on the public policy that trademarks ensure
the quality of a product and promote competition, and, therefore, should be afforded the greatest protection possible. 15 The
Lanham Act has evolved into protecting the public against
likelihood of confusion as to the source, affiliation or sponsorship of products and services. 16 Additionally, in 1996 the Lan-

10. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text for a description of the likelihood
of confusion analysis.
11. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text for a list of the factors considered
to determine if trademark infringement has occurred.
12. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
available remedies in a trademark infringement case.
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1998). The Lanham Act, codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511127, defines "trademark" as, "any word, name, symbol or device or any combination
thereof ... used to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product,
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even
if that source is unknown." [d. The Lanham Act defines "service mark" as, "any word,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof used by a person ... to identifY and
distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of
others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown." The
term "trademark" is often used to refer to service marks as well. See id. The Lanham
Act establishes both procedural and substantive rights in trademarks and unfair
competition law. The Act includes the procedure for registration of marks as well as
the remedies for such infringement. See id. §§ 1051-1127.
14. See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Congress, 2d Sess., 5 (1946).
15. See id. at 6.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1998). This section imposes infringement liability on a
person who uses a mark that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive ...." [d.
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ham Act added legislation that protects trademaI'k owners
against dilution of their marks. 17
Today, trademarks are protected under Federal and state
statute and common law. IS These laws protect against use of
confusingly similar marks in commerce by preventing deception of the purchasing public and safeguarding against misappropriation of an owner's efforts to market his or her products
or services. 19

1.

Distinctiveness

Trademarks must be either inherently distinctive or have
acquired secondary meaning to merit full statutory protection
against infringement.2O Inherent distinctiveness means that
the word or symbol does not bring to mind the product or service, but serves the express purpose of functioning as a trademark, such as Kodak for film. 21 If a trademark is not inher-

17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1998). Dilution is dermed as "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of
the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and
other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." Id.
18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1998). See gerrerally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 5 (4th. ed. 1997). This
treatise provides a history of the development of both common law and federal
legislation for trademarks.
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1998). Trademark infringement occurs when:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person,
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or
promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial
. activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.

Id.
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1998). Trademarks granted registration on the principal
register are afforded the full statutory protection of the Lanham Act against
infringement by others. Registration on the principal register is allowed so long as the
mark sought to be registered is not already a registered mark or will not confuse the
purchasing public. See id.
21. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 11:1. Inherently distinctive words or symbols
are generally not already familiar to buyers; they do not conjure up the image of the
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ently distinctive, it may acquire secondary meaning through its
substantially exclusive and continuous use in commerce for a
period of five years. 22 If the trademark does not meet either
the inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning requirement, statutes provide little protection against infringement by
others.23
A trademark's distinctiveness is categorized as generic,24 descriptive,25 suggestive,26 or arbitrary or fanciful. 27 Generic symbols and terms are not entitled to trademark protection because they wholly describe the product or service, such as the
word "bread" to describe bread.28 Descriptive terms describe a

product or service itself.
Marks that are inherently distinctive may operate
immediately as a trademark. See id.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1998). Any mark that has been used in commerce for
a period of more than five years gains a presumption of distinctiveness. See id. See
also McCARTHY, supra note 18, § 11:2. A mark's use in commerce and the resulting
consumer recognition it receives as the identifier of the origin or source of the goods or
services establishes its distinctiveness. See id.
23. See 15 U.S.C. §1052 (1998). Trademarks that cause confusion, are merely
descriptive, or otherwise do not meet the Patent and Trademark Office's criteria for
registration are either denied registration on the principal register, which provides full
protection of trademark law, or are registered on the supplemental register, which
provides minimal protection against infringement. See id. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§
1091-1095 (1998). These sections provide a background and the process for registering
a mark on the supplemental register. Many foreign countries require registration in
the owner's home country prior to registration of the mark in a foreign country. The
supplemental register exists primarily to provide technical registration for an
otherwise unregistrable mark so that an owner may be able to register the mark in
another country. See id.
24. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 12:3. Generic terms are not protectable
under trademark statutes because they use the name of the product or service to
identify it.
25. See id. §§ 11:16, 15:1. "A mark is descriptive if it is descriptive of the intended
purpose, function or use of the goods, of the size of the goods, of the class of users of the
goods, of a desirable characteristic of the goods, or of the end effect upon the user." [d.
§ 11:16. These marks are not inherently distinctive and the law requires that
secondary meaning be proven before the trademark is deeme4 protectable from
infringement. See id. § 15:1.
26. See id. § 11:62. Suggestive marks merely suggest some quality or ingredient
of the goods or services. These marks are protected without any necessity for proving
secondary meaning. See id.
27. See id. § 11:6. The strongest marks are fanciful or arbitrary. These marks
have no relation to the product or service, and are invented for the sole purpose of
operating as a trademark. See id.
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 15, cmt. a. (1995).
"Generic descriptions are not subject to appropriation as trademarks at common law
and are ineligible for registration under state and federal trademark statutes." [d. See
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purpose, function, or desired result of the product or service,
and require proof of secondary meaning in order to merit
trademark protection.29 Suggestive and arbitrary or fanciful
symbols and terms merit the broadest legal protection because
they are utilized in a non-descriptive fashion, or are invented
for the sole purpose of serving as a trademark for a product or
service. 30

2.

Trademark Infringement

Trademark infringement occurs when a defendant uses the
plaintifi's mark, or a mark similar to the plaintifi's, that is
likely to confuse a buyer as to the source, affiliation, or sponsorship of the defendant's produ.ct. 31 Courts determine likelihood of confusion by analyzing a number of factors relating to
the marks, known as the likelihood of confusion test. 32 Con-

also Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Cassini Tailors, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 (S.D. Tex.
1990). The court discussed the strength of each party's marks, noting that a generic
term is a common descriptive name for a product or service,· and as such is entitled to
no trademark protection. See id.
29. See id. Descriptive terms describe a characteristic or ingredient of a product
or service, and are entitled to trademark protection only if the mark has acquired
distinctiveness in identifying the product or service. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. §
1052(0 (1998). Merely descriptive terms may be registered as trademarks only if it has
become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce through substantially exclusive
and continuous use for a period of five years. See id.
30. See Cassini, 764 F. Supp. at 1109. A suggestive term does not directly
describe the product or service, but requires thought or imagination to connect the
mark to the corresponding product or service. A suggestive mark is entitled to
trademark protection without a showing of distinctiveness. Arbitrary or fanciful marks
neither describe the product or service nor suggest the nature of the product or service.
Therefore, these marks are considered inherently distinctive and are entitled to full
protection against trademark infringement. See id.
31. See Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Systems, Inc., 803·F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1986).
To prove infringement, the court held the plaintiff must show that defendant's use of
the same mark, "XL," was likely to create confusion in the minds of potential customers
seeking to purchase floor care equipment. The court found that there was no evidence
of actual confusion, the plaintiffs mark was weak, and there was a lack of similarity
between the marks when viewed in context. Finding no confusion as to source,
affiliation or sponsorship between the marks, the court overturned the jury's verdict of
infringement. See id. at 174.
32. See In the Matter of E.!. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(1973). This was the first case issued by the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals that provided specific guidance for trademark infringement cases. See
. id. at 1360. The court established thirteen factors which courts may take into
consideration when determining the likelihood of confusion between identical or
similar marks. These factors are: similarity of marks in their appearance, sound,
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fusing similarity does not indicate mere similarity in marks,
but the resulting confusion of customers as to the source of
goods or services. 33 However, it is not sufficient to establish a
likelihood of confusion if confusion is merely possible; rather,
likelihood of confusion is equivalent to probable confusion.34
The Fifth Circuit considers seven factors in determining
whether likelihood of confusion exists. 35 The first factor, the
type of trademark, takes into account the strength of the

connotation and commercial impression; similarity and nature of goods or services;
similarity of trade channels; conditions under which the sale is made and who the
buyers are; fame of the prior mark; number and nature of similar marks in use on
similar goods; nature and extent of any actual confusion; variety of goods on which a
mark is or is not used; market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior
mark; extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark;
extent of potential confusion; and any other established fact probative of the effect of
the mark's use. See id. at 1361. See also Roto·Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45
(5th Cir. 1975). This is the leading Fifth Circuit case on trademark infringement. The
court established seven factors to consider when determining whether a likelihood of
confusion exists between two marks. The factors are: type of trademark, similarity of
design, similarity of products, identity of retail outlets and purchasers, identity of
advertising media utilized, intent and actual confusion. See id.
33. See Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. Vision Industries Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q.
179, 189 (1980). The question of likelihood of confusion is predicated on the reaction of
an average consumer to marks encountered in the marketplace. The cOurt held that
consumers would be confused by the marks "Vii" and "VII" in the marketplace because
consumers usually have only a vague and general recollection of marks, which must be
taken into account when determining whether a likelihood of confusion as to source of
goods exists. See id.
34. See Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling and Clamp Co., 203 U.S.P.Q. 537,
541 (1979). The court stated that, in determining whether a likelihood of confusion
exists when two marks are being concurrently used in the marketplace, there must be
contemporaneous use of both marks for an appreciable time so there is ample
opportunity for confusion to arise if it were going to arise. The defendant argued that
the two marks had co-existed in the marketplace for one and a half years without
evidence of actual confusion, and based on this evidence the court should fmd that no
likelihood of confusion exists between the two marks. The court held that confusion
only had to be probable to merit a finding of likelihood of confusion, and that one and a
half years of co-existence in the marketplace was not sufficient time to disprove a
likelihood of confusion. See id.
35. See Rota-Rooter, 513 F.2d at 45. In this leading case, the Fifth Circuit
combined the factors considered in three prior cases, Continental Motors Corp. v.
Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1967); American Foods, Inc. v.
Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1963); and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States
Life Ins. Co. 246 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957), to establish
the current list of seven factors considered in determining likelihood of confusion in a
trademark infringement case. See id.
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mark. 36 The second factor, similarity of design, recognizes that
marks very similar in appearance, sight, sound or meaning are
more likely to confuse purchasers. 37 The third factor, similarity
of the products, considers whether a likelihood of confusion
arises due to the similarity between the same or related products and services. 38 The fourth factor, identity of retail outlets
and purchasers, determines if the same purchasers will be exposed to both products. 39 The fifth factor, identity of advertising media utilized, analyzes potentially confusing marketing

36. See Cassini, 764 F. Supp. at 1109. The court stated, "The strength of the mark
depends upon its degree of arbitrariness in relation to the products or services with
which it is used." Id. The court then described the four categories of distinctiveness,
finding that the plaintiffs "Oleg Cassini" and "Cassini" marks are arbitrary because
they do not describe or suggest the nature of the plaintiffs products. See id. See also
McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2nd Cir. 1979). The
strength of the mark "refers to the distinctiveness of the mark, or more precisely, its
tendency to identify the goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular,
although possibly anonymous, source." Id. The strength or distinctiveness of the mark
determines the ease with which it may be established as a valid trademark and the
degree of protection it will be afforded. See id.
37. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 201 (5th Cir. 1998)
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt. c. (1995» '"Even if
prospective purchasers recognize that the two designations are distinct, confusion may
result if purchasers are likely to assume that the similarities in the designations
indicate a connection between the two users. The relevant inquiry is whether, under
the circumstances of the use, the marks are sufficiently similar that prospective
purchasers are likely to believe that the two users are somehow associated." Id. See
also Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1485 (lOth Cir. 1987). The
court found that while the similarity of the words used in the"Jordache" mark and the
"Lard ashe" mark would support an inference of likelihood of (:onfusion, the
dissimilarities in the designs used in the marks greatly outweigh the similarities. See
id. See also In re Mack, 197 U.S.P.Q. 755, 757 (1977). The court held that similarity in
anyone of the elements of sound, appearance or meaning is sufficient to indicate a
likelihood of confusion. The court found a likelihood of confusion regarding concurrent
use of the marks "Mac" and "Mack" because the marks are similar in both appearance
and sound. See id.
38. See Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 505 (5th
Cir. 1980). Exxon is a petroleum dealer and the Texas Motor Exchange corporation
opened a business to sell petroleum using the trademark "Texon." The court held that
"Texon" infringes the "Exxon" mark, but another similar mark, "Tex-On," does not
infringe the "Exxon" mark because there was a similarity in products and services
between "Texon" and "Exxon," but not between "Tex-On" and "Exxon." See id.
39. See Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 259 (5th Cir. 1980).
Amstar sued Domino's Pizza for infringement of Amstar's mark, "Domino." However,
the appellate court did not agree that there was likelihood of confusion as to origin or
source between the marks because the sugar sales market and the pizza sales market
are very different and do not overlap. See id. at 259.
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activities. 40 The sixth factor weighs the defendant's intent or
lack thereof in adopting a similar mark. 41 The seventh factor,
actual confusion, recognizes that the best evidence for likelihood of confusion is actual confusion. 42 The absence or presence of anyone of these factors is not dispositive, nor must a
finding of likelihood of confusion necessarily be supported even
by a majority of the factors considered. 43

B.

PARODY

The likelihood of confusion test is not limited to these seven
factors.44 Courts may also consider other factors relevant to the

40. See Guardian Prods. Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. 738, 741 (1978).
The court observed that a likelihood of confusion can be found if the products and
services are related in some manner and "the conditions and activities surrounding the
marketing of these goods or services are such that they could be encountered by the
same persons under circumstances that could, because of the similarity of the marks
used therewith, give rise to the mistaken belief that they originate from or are in some
way associated with the same producer." [d. Here, the court held that "Scott
Guardian" was confusingly similar with "Guardian" because both marks were to
identify disposable medical-related paper products. See id. See also Oreck, 803 F.2d at
172-173. In this case, the court found that advertisements for both products appeared
in the same trade journals. Even so, the court found the likelihood of confusion
resulting from this activity negligible. The court explained that the danger of
confusion in using the same advertising media only arises when the trademarks are
deceptively similar. See id. at 173.
41. See Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485. The court noted that mere intent to confuse
supports a likelihood of confusion. However, the court held that Hogg Wyld's mark,
°Lardashe," as a parody, did not infringe Jordache's °Jordache" mark because, as a
well-developed parody, the mark amused, rather than confused, the public as to source,
affiliation or sponSorship between the marks. See id. at 1486-1487.
42. See World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Luttrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482,
489 (5th Cir. 1971). The court stated, "there can be no more positive or substantial
proof of the likelihood of confusion than proof of actual confusion." [d.· The court
affirmed summary judgment for World Carpets on the basis that World Carpets had
proven actual confusion between "World Carpets" and "New World Carpets," thus
establishing likelihood of confusion between the marks. See id.
43. See Conan Properties, Inc., v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir.
1985). The court addressed whether Conans Pizza's trademark was confusingly similar
to that of Conan Properties' "Conan the Barbarian" popular comic character. The court
held that not all factors must be present to prove a trademark infringement case, and
each case should be decided based on the context of the specific facts presented. See id.
44. See id. at 150. The court noted that the principal seven factors are a "nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining whether a likelihood of
confusion exists." See also Armco, Inc., v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., Inc., 693 F.2d
1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1982). In agreeing to consider the factor of product pricing in a
likelihood of confusion case as to source of the service between alarm companies, the
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case, such as parody. 45 Parody is "a literary or artistic work
that imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for
comic effect or ridicule."46
Because parody is a form of social and literary criticism, it is
protected under the First Amendment. 47 However, a trademark owner does not lose trademark protection merely because
the alleged infringement is a work of artistic expression. 48 A
parody that creates a likelihood of confusion is still subject to a
trademark infringement action. 49 On the other hand, the obvious recognition of a well-developed, non-confusing parody may
weigh heavily enough in an infringement analysis to overcome
a likelihood of confusion between the two marks. 50

appellate court recognized that the trial judge "correctly pointed out that the likelihood
of confusion analysis is 'not limited to' the seven factors." [d.
45. See Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993). The
court stated that parody is not an affirmative defense, but an additional factor courts
may consider in determining likelihood of confusion in a trademark infringement case.
The court found that the mark "Mike," as a parody, did not present a likelihood of
confusion as to source, affiliation or sponsorship with the mark "Nike." See id. at 1229.
46. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1317 (3d ed. 1992).
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The First Amendment reads, in part: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ...." [d. See also Dr. Seuss
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.2d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1994). Recognizing
that parody, like other works of artistic expression, has socially significant value as
free speech, the court gave wide latitude to the art form when considering whether
copyright infringement had occurred. See id. See also Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, 886 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1989). However, the work's
status as a parody does not relieve the parodist of his evidentiary burden to prove lack
of infringement. See id.
48. See Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 49 (2d. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 907 (1989). CBS sued Silverman for attempting to make a musical of its "Amos 'n'
Andy" characters. The court stated that a trademark owner does not lose his
trademark protection because the infringing work is considered artistic expression.
However, the court ruled that CBS had abandoned its trademark rights by not
asserting them since 1966. See id. at 51. See also Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494.
Similarly, in Cliffs Notes the court used a balancing approach to the case, giving special
consideration to the free-speech protection that is afforded to artistic expression yet
still addressing the likelihood of confusion factors for trademark infringement. See id.
49. See id. at 494. See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d
769, 773 (8th Cir. 1994). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that a parodic, fictitious advertisement for "Michelob Oily" produced by Balducci
Publications created a likelihood of confusion with Anheuser-Busch advertisements for
"Michelob" beer products. See id.
50. See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 497. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held
that Bantam's parody "Spy Notes" of Cliffs Notes popular study guides did not infringe
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REMEDIES FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

The remedies available for infringement depend on the nature of the infringement. 51 If the infringement was unintentional, the remedy is limited to injunctive relief against future
infringement. 52 However, willful infringers who cause confusion regarding association, affiliation or sponsorship of another's products or services may be liable for treble damages
and subject to a permanent injunction against further use of
the infringing mark. 53

In Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Barry Capece,54 the court
found that Capece intentionally infringed Elvis Presley Enterprises' marks by drawing on Elvis Presley's worldwide fame to
attract customers to the club. 65 Fortunately for Capece, Elvis
Presley Enterprises failed to properly preserve its request for
an accounting of profits. 56 Therefore, Capece was subject only
to a permanent injunction against further use of the Velvet Elvis mark in relation to its confusing advertising practices. 57
III.
FACTS OF ELVIS PRESLEY ENTERPRISES, INC.
v. CAPECE
Through a testamentary trust, Elvis Presley Enterprises
(EPE) is the assignee and registrant of trademarks, copyrights,

Cliffs Notes, Inc.'s trademarks because the parody did not create a likelihood of'
confusion as to source, affiliation or sponsorship. See id.
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1998). Injunctive relief, damages, attorneys' fees,
profits, damages and costs, and treble damages may be available depending upon the
injury and circumstances. See id.
52. See id. § 1125. However, due to First Amendment concerns regarding freedom
of the press, injunctive relief is not available if the injunction would prevent mass
distribution of a publication. See id. § 1114. See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 784
(6th ed. 1991). Injunctive relief is "a court order prohibiting someone from doing some
specified act or commanding someone to undo some wrong or injury." [d.
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1998). A court may award three times the profits made
by the defendant or three times the damages sustained by the plaintiff, whichever is
greater, in addition to attorneys' fees. When calculating the damages to be awarded,
the defendant must prove any costs that may be deducted from the damages awarded.
See id.
54. 141 F.3d 188, 198 (5th Cir. 1998).
55. See id. at 203.
56. See Elvis, 141 F .3d at 206-207.
57. See id.
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and all publicity rights belonging to Elvis Presley's estate. 58
EPE's exclusive rights under this testamentary trust are marketed through a licensing program that grants licensees the
right to market Elvis Presley merchandise worldwide. 59 Although EPE also operates a restaurant and ice cream parlor at
Graceland, none of its service marks are registered in the restaurant and tavern business category.60
In April 1991, entrepreneur Barry Capece opened The Velvet Elvis nightclub in Houston, Texas. 61 The Velvet Elvis's
theme purported "to parody an era remembered for its sensationalism and transient desire for flashiness. "62 To convey this
parody, Capece decorated The Velvet Elvis with velvet paintings of Elvis Presley, Stevie Wonder, Chuck Berry, and Bruce
Lee. 63 He also hung beaded curtains and a painting of a barechested Mona Lisa, covered the men's restroom walls with

58. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 787 (S.D. Tex.
1996). EPE has over a dozen registered trademarks in Elvis Presley's name and
likeness, though none of these trademarks are registered in the restaurant and tavern
business category. Elvis Presley assigned his intellectual property rights to Elvis
Presley Enterprises through a trust established in his will. See id. See also BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1475 (6th ed. 1991). A testamentary trust is a trust created by a will
which takes effect only upon the testator's death. It provides a mechanism to assign
the rights of one person to another. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1112 (1998).
Trademarks are registered by classification of goods and services. Marks that are not
confusingly similar are entitled to registration regardless of classification. However,
similar marks may co-exist in different classifications on the register if consumers are
not likely to confuse the two marks. See id.
59. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788. The largest percentage of EPE's annual
earnings comes from sales of Elvis memorabilia, including items ranging from t·shirts
to juke boxes, with sales exceeding $20 million dollars in the last five years. To protect
these earnings, EPE has registered trademarks for the various forms of memorabilia.
See id.
60. See id. at 787.
61. See id. at 788. The bar was opened through a limited partnership, Beers 'R'
Us. Shortly after opening the club, the Beers 'R' Us partnership dissolved for business
reasons. See id.
62. [d. The district and appellate courts cite several different targets for Capece's
parody. These include the sixties; a gauche, materialistic lifestyle; velvet paintings and
other gaudy decor; restaurants similar to the Hard Rock Cafe and Planet Hollywood;
and indirectly, society's fascination with Elvis Presley. The nightclub also boasted to
be the first cigar bar in Houston. See id.; Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141
F.3d 188, 200 (5th Cir. 1998).
63. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788. Capece removed most of the Elvis Presley
memorabilia and decorations from the club prior to the trial. See id.
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Playboy centerfolds, and furnished the bar with vinyl furniture.54

On August 28, 1991, Capece filed a federal service mark application for The Velvet Elvis for use in the restaurant and tavern business. 65 In December 1992, the Patent and Trademark
Office published the service mark in the Official Gazette to give
notice of the pending registration and provide an opportunity
for opposition by affected parties. 66 Although EPE admitted it
was aware of the mark's publication at that time, it did not object to the service mark's registration within the allowed thirtyday period. 67 Because the mark was not opposed, the Patent
and Trademark Office issued the Velvet Elvis service mark to
Capece for use in the restaurant and tavern business on March
9,1993.66

However, in July 1993, The Velvet Elvis closed for business
reasons. 69 During the next several months, Capece solicited
investors and obtained financial backing to reopen the night-

64. See id.
65. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1112 (1998). Trademarks are registered in respect
to certain goods or services. Similar, and sometimes even identical, marks may be
allowed registration if concurrent use of the marks would not create a likelihood of
confusion. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (1998). Registrants oftrademarks file for
registration with the Patent and Trademark Office. The written application is
reviewed by a Patent Office examining attorney and, if all particulars are satisfied, the
mark is published in the Patent Office's Official Gazette for notice to the public. If no
opposition is filed, a certificate ofregistration is iBBUed to the trademark owner. See id.
§ 1051.
66. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (1998). Publication
in the Official Gazette serves as constructive notice to anyone who may oppose the
mark. See id.
67. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1998). When an
applicant's proposed trademark is published in the Official Gazette, any person
believing he or she will be damaged by the registration of the mark may me a notice of
opposition within thirty days of the publication of the mark. If a notice of opposition is
filed, the Patent and Trademark Office considers the opponent's arguments in deciding
whether to allow registration of the mark. Otherwise, the mark is deemed registrable
by the PTO and a certificate of registration is issued. See id.
68. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788.
69. See id. The bar closed for several months and the Beers 'R' Us partnership
dissolved. See id.
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club at a different location in Houston. 7o In January 1994,
Capece formed a new partnership, Velvet Limited, and began
renovation on a newly leased building. 71
In July 1994, while the renovation was being completed,
EPE sent a cease and desist letter to Capece, threatening to fIle
suit unless the nightclub dropped the term "Elvis" from its
name. 72 Despite this warning, Capece opened the new Velvet
Elvis nightclub in August 1994, and continued to feature plays
on Elvis Presley's name, movies and songs in its advertisements. 73 The Velvet Elvis continued referencing Elvis Presley
in its advertising through early 1995. 74
IV.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

EPE fIled suit against Capece and his partners (Capece) in
April 1995, alleging federal and common-law unfair competition and trademark infringement, and federal trademark dilution. 75 EPE also alleged Capece violated its state-law rights of

70. See id. A second limited partnership was formed under the name "Velvet
Limited." Audley, Incorporated was the general partner, of which Capece was the sole
shareholder. See id.
71. See id. The new nightclub was located on Richmond Avenue, not far from the
former nightclub's address on Kipling Street. See id.
72. See id. See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 223 (6th ed. 1991). A cease and
desist order is a court order prohibiting a person or business from continuing a
particular course of conduct. A cease and desist letter is usually sent by the client's
attorney, before filing a claim, insisting that the alleged infringer cease and desist all
activities which purportedly infringe the client's trademarks and other intellectual
property rights. See id.
73. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788. The advertisements included direct references
to Elvis Presley's movies and songs, such as "The King Lives," "Viva La Elvis," and
"Elvis Has Not Left The Building." The bar's menu contained direct references to Elvis
as well, such as "Love Me Blenders" and "Your Football Hound Dog." See id. at 789.
74. See id. The district court noted that even though Capece requested that The
Velvet Elvis's employees discontinue use of Elvis's name, pictures, or direct references
to Elvis in the nightclub's advertisements without Capece's express approval, the
infringing advertisements continued through early 1995. Finding that Capece's
management style left a risk that the infringing activity would recur, the court issued
an injunction against The Velvet Elvis forbidding such advertising practices. See id.
75. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Tex.
1996). The Velvet Limited partnership included Barry Capece and Audley, Inc., the
investor for the second nightclub. Capece, Audley, and the partnership were each
listed as defendants in the suit. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1998). Trademark
dilution is defined as, "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition
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publicity in Elvis Presley's name and likeness. 76 EPE sought
injunctive relief, an accounting of profits, attorneys' fees and a
court order directing the Patent and Trademark Office to cancel Capece's registration of The Velvet Elvis service mark. 77
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas heard
the case in November 1996. 78 The court first reviewed the bar's
service mark and decor, rmding that the bar did not present a
likelihood of confusion with EPE's marks because the bar was
presented as a parody of the sixties lifestyle. 79 The court then
reviewed separately the Velvet Elvis's advertising practices,
and found that the advertisements infringed EPE's marks because they were presented outside the parodic backdrop of the
bar where the public would recognize them as a parody. 80
Therefore, the court ruled in favor of EPE as to its claims of
trademark infringement and rights of publicity violations regarding the bar's advertising practices. 81

between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception." See id. Trademark dilution is covered under the Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995. See id. § 1125(c).
76. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 789. These claims are covered under Texas common
law and TEX. PROP. CODE § 26.011 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1986), which prohibits a
person from using a deceased individual's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness in any medium in connection with products, merchandise or goods or for
purposes of advertising, selling or soliciting purchases for such merchandise. See id.
See also Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994). To establish a
prima facie case for violation of a deceased person's rights of publicity, one must prove
that the defendant has appropriated another's identity and is using it for trade or·
commercial benefit. See id.
77. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788.
78. See id. at 787.
79. See id. at 791-793. The court went through the seven foundational factors for
likelihood of confusion, fmding none of them likely to cause confusion. See id. at 796797. The district court also considered parody as an additional factor of likelihood of
confusion related to the bar's service mark and decor. See id. at 791-793.
80. See id. at 797. The court found that the presentation and content of the
advertisements infringed EPE's marks. The "Elvis" portion of the mark was displayed
in large letters, while the "Velvet" portion of the mark was almost unnoticeable. Thus,
the court found that the bar focused its advertisements on the "Elvis· portion of the
mark to draw customers to its establishment. The court also found that the
advertisements depicting Elvis's name and likeness, without the parodic backdrop of
the bar itself, were likely to cause confusion in the purchasing public. Since the public
would not know that the bar is a parody until entering the club, the advertisements
were found to be misleading. See id.
81. See id.
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Accordingly, the district judge granted permanent injunctive relief to EPE.82 The injunction barred Capece from using
Elvis Presley's image or likeness, phrases inextricably linked to
his identity, and from displaying the "Elvis" portion of the
service mark in print larger than the "Velvet" portion of the
mark. 83 However, the court ruled in favor of Capece on the
trademark dilution and rights of publicity claims regarding use
of the word "Elvis" in the service mark, and allowed Capece to
continue using the service mark to identify the bar. 84 Subsequently, EPE appealed the district court's denial of its trademark infringement, federal dilution and rights of publicity
claims regarding use of the service mark as an identifier of the
nightclub. 85

V.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS

The Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, disagreeing
with the district court's approach in determining whether a
likelihood of confusion existed between the marks. 86 The Fifth
Circuit stated that the district court misapplied the doctrine of
parody in its decision, and failed to consider the impact of
Capece's advertising practices on the service mark as a whole. 87
The appellate court analyzed the Velvet Elvis's service mark,
decor and advertising practices together, and found that the

82. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 803.
83. See id. Although EPE requested an accounting of profits, no evidence was
presented at trial to show lost or diverted sales. Therefore, this relief was denied. EPE
also requested an award of attorneys' fees, but the court found that the infringement
was unintentional and therefore denied the request. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. §1117
(1998). The Lanham Act requires intentional infringement for an award of attorneys'
fees. See id.
84. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 803. Because the Court only found that the
advertising infringed EPE's marks, the Court refused EPE's request that the court
direct the Patent and Trademark Office to cancel the Velvet Elvis service mark, thus
allowing Capece's continued use of the service mark for the nightclub. See id.
85. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1998).
EPE did not properly preserve its claims in the trial court for an accounting of profits
from Capece or for recovery of attorneys' fees. Therefore, it lost the right to appeal
these issues. See id. at 193.
86. See id. at 196. The Fifth Circuit, citing Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Koppers Co., 40
F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1994), held that when the district court's findings are based on
a "clearly erroneous view of the law," the appellate court is to review questions of law
de novo and questions of fact for clear error. See id.
87. See id. at 191.
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Velvet Elvis mark, when viewed as a whole, infringed EPE's
marks. 88 Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district
court's ruling that no infringement took place as to the bar's
service mark and decor, and enjoined Capece's further use of
the Velvet Elvis mark. 89
A.

ADVERTISING PRACTICES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
REVIEWED IN ISOLATION

The Fifth Circuit stated that servIce mark infringement
must be determined by considering the mark and its surrounding activities as a whole. 90 Noting the Supreme Court's
position that "protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition
of the psychological function of symbols," the Court ruled that
the mark must be considered in the context is which it was
used, not in a vacuum. 91 The court emphasized that advertising is highly probative in the likelihood of confusion test in
service mark cases because an identifying trademark cannot be

88. See id. at 207.
89. See id. at 188. Although the district court ruled that Capece could continue
using the Velvet Elvis service mark to identify the bar, the appellate court ruled that,
viewing the mark as a whole, the Velvet Elvis mark caused a likelihood of confusion
with EPE's marks and could no longer be used in any context. See id. at 207.
90. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 197 (citing The Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality
Corp., 89 F.2d 955, 962 (2d Cir. 1996) (considering the appearance of the mark in
advertising in determining similarity of marks); Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91,
94·95 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Systems, Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 171
(5th Cir. 1986) (considering the presentation of the marks in advertising in
determining the similarity of the marks and the defendant's intent); Sun Banks of Fla.,
Inc. v. Sun Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 1981) (considering the
presentation of the marks in advertising in determining the similarity of the marks);
National Ass'n of Blue Shield Plans v. United Bankers Life Ins. Co., 362 F.2d 374, 378
(5th Cir. 1966) (comparing marks as used in advertising in newspapers and on
television where the black and white format did not allow for color distinctions). The
Elvis court held that, in determining likelihood of confusion, service marks should be
viewed as they appear to the consumer in the advertising for the service. See id.
91. See id. at 197 (citing Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942». The Mishawaka court explained the law recognizes the
psychological function of symbols, and courts must protect trademarks to prevent
confusion of the public. The Court held that, although the infringed party is not
entitled to profits made apart from an infringing use of his mark, an infringer who
cannot prove separate profits made from infringement and profits made from his own
work must give up his entire profits due to the infringement. See Mishawaka, 316 U.S.
at 205.
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physically affixed to the service.92 The court also observed that
federal statutory law specifically makes advertising one of the
relevant factors in determining the likelihood of confusion for a
service mark. 93 Therefore, the court insisted that the Capece's
advertising of The Velvet Elvis nightclub must be considered in
conjunction with the bar's name and decor to determine if a
likelihood of confusion existed between the marks. 94
B.

PARODY AS A FACTOR OF INFRINGEMENT

The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that parody
is an appropriate additional factor to be considered ill the likelihood of confusion test. 95 Because this was the first occasion
the Fifth Circuit had considered parody in the (,,ontext of
trademark law, the appellate court looked to the Supreme
Court's decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 96 for guidance on the
legal boundaries of parody.97 The Fifth Circuit stated that although the Supreme Court in Campbell analyzed parody to determine copyright infringement rather than trademark infringement, the Campbell analysis was still relevant to treatment of parody in the present case. 98

92. See id. at 197. The court cited the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §21(a)(I) (1995), which states that "the overall impression created by the
[marks} as they are used in marketing the respective goods and services is relevant to
how similar the marks are." Id.
93. See id. at 197 (citing 15 U.S.C. §1127). The Lanham Act defines "in
commerce" in the context of a service mark as "when it is used or displayed in the sale
or advertising of services." See 15 U.S.C. §1127. Thus, advertising is central to the
determination of likelihood of confusion between service marks. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at
197.
94. See id. at 198.
95. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 198. The court cited Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc. 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997), which held that parody is an additional
factor to be considered in determining whether likelihood of confusion exists between
two marks. See id.
96. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
97. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Acuff-Rose Music sued 2
Live Crew for copyright infringement when the band made a parody of Roy Orbison's
hit, ·Oh Pretty Woman." The court held that the material borrowed for the parody was
necessary to achieve the purpose of the parody, and thus constituted fair use as a
criticism and comment on the original work. See id. at 594.
98. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 199. The Fifth Circuit looked at the Supreme Court's
definition of parody as applied to copyright law and a parody's need and justification
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In Campbell, Acuff-Rose Music sued the band, 2 Live Crew,
for copyright infringement.when the group released a song titled "Pretty Woman" which copied significant portions of Roy
Orbison's hit song, u~h, Pretty Woman."99 Denying the infringement, 2 Live Crew claimed that because its song was a
parody of Orbison's song, the copying of portions of the song
constituted fair use. loo In determining whether the borrowed
portion of the work constituted fair 'use or copyright infringement, the Supreme Court stated that if the parody's purpose
has no critical bearing on the substance of the original work,
the justification for borrowing from the original work diminishes accordingly. 101 Justice Souter, writing for the majority of
the Court, explained, "when parody takes aim at a particular
original work, the parody must be able to 'conjure up' at least
enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable. "102 Thus, the Campbell court held if the parody's
purpose is to criticize the original work, the parody must be
able to borrow enough of the original work for the audience to
understand what is being criticized. 103 Taking this into consideration, the Court found that 2 Live Crew's use of the title and
chorus of Orbison's song, u~h, Pretty Woman" could constitute

for mimicking an original work. The court then applied the same reasoning to the facts
in the Elvis trademark infringement case. See id. at 198·200.
99. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572.
100. See id. The Court called upon Justice Story's summation of the fair use
defense in Folsom v. March 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Justice Story said the
court must "look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials use, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." [d. at 348. See
also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1997). If the material borrowed is for the purpose of criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research, it is not an infringement
of the author's copyright. To determine fair use, factors to be considered are the
purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
See id.
101. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. The court explained that one is not allowed to
borrow from another's work merely to avoid the drudgery in "working up something
fresh". [d. See also Mary Shapiro, Comment, An Analysis of the Fair Use Defense in
Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin, 28 GoLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 1 (1998) for a discussion
of the fair use defense in a copyright infringement case.
102. See id. at 588. Justice Souter then acknowledged that what makes the parody
recognizable is quotation from the original work's most distinct, memorable features.
See id.
103. See id.
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fair use and remanded the case for consideration of that issue. 104
Justice Souter clarified the boundaries of the Court's ruling
in a footnote, explaining that looser forms of parody may also
constitute fair use if the parody creates little or no risk of market substitution. I05 Despite this clarification, the Fifth Circuit
applied the reasoning of Justice Kennedy's more stringent, concurring opinion which allowed a parodist to escape liability
from copyright infringement only if the target of the parody
was the original work. I06 Using this restrictive approach, the
court held that because Capece's intent was to parody "faddish
bars of the sixties" and not Elvis Presley himself, there was no
justification to borrow any portion of EPE's marks. 107 Thus, the
court concluded that parody was irrelevant to the infringement
analysis in this case and would not be considered as a factor in
determining whether a likelihood of confusion existed between
the Velvet Elvis mark and EPE's marks. lOS

104. See id. at 594.
105. See id. at 580 n.14. Justice Souter stated:
A parody that more loosely targets an original than the parody presented here
may still be sufficiently aimed at an original work to come within our analysis
of parody. If a parody whose wide dissemination in the market runs the risk
of serving as a substitute for the original or licensed derivatives (See infra, at
590·594), discussing factor four), it is more incumbent on one claiming fair use
to establish the extent of transformation and the parody's critical relationship
to the original. By contrast, when there is little or no risk of market
substitution, whether because of the large extent of transformation of the
earlier work, the new work's minimal distribution in the market, the small
extent to which it borrows from an original, or other factors, taking parodic
aim at an original is a less critical factor in the analysis and looser forms of
parody may be found to be fair use, as may satire with lesser justification for
the borrowing than would otherwise be required.
[d.
106. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 199 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring». Although not stated explicitly in the court's opinion, the Fifth Circuit
followed Justice Kennedy's more stringent approach to liability for parodists, ignoring
Justice Souter's footnote explaining that looser forms of parody could be tolerated in
many circumstances. See id.
107. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 200. Capece intended to parody the entire sixties
lifestyle, including obsession with superstars such as Elvis Presley, by opening The
Velvet Elvis nightclub. Capece's sole target was not Elvis Presley. See id.
108. See id. Because CaPece's target was not Elvis Presley alone, the court
determined that the parody factor was simply irrelevant to the infringement analysis.
Without that latitude afforded a parody in considering the overlapping material
between the two marks. a parody will seldom pass the likelihood of confusion test.
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FACTORS OF INFRINGEMENT

The Fifth Circuit then reviewed the five factors of the likelihood of confusion test that were affected by the district court's
isolated analysis of The Velvet Elvis's advertising practices,
name and decor. 109 Reviewing the activities as a whole, the appellate court concluded that the Velvet Elvis mark infringed
EPE's trademarks. 110
The court first considered the type of trademark, noting that
the stronger the mark, the more protection it will receive. 111
The court found that EPE's marks were very strong because
Elvis Presley's name and likeness have achieved "worldwide
fame and instantaneous recognition," thus meriting the utmost
protection from infringement. 112 Capece argued that the Velvet
Elvis mark had a different meaning than EPE's marks and
that EPE failed to show distinctiveness of its marks outside the
entertainment industry.113 However, the court was not convinced by these arguments, and held that this factor weighed
in favor of a likelihood of confusion. 114
Second, the court considered the marks' similarities by comparing the sight, sound and meaning of each of the marks. 115

109. See id. at 200-204. Only five of the seven likelihood of confusion factors were
reviewed separately for advertising. Thus, the Fifth Circuit only reviewed those
affected by the district court's erroneous application of the law. The Fifth Circuit
agreed with the district court that the identity of retail outlets and purchasers and the
identity of the advertising media were irrelevant in this case. See id.
110. See id. at 204-205. Had the district court analyzed the advertising practices
along with the bar's name and d6cor, the district court would have come to the same
conclusion as the appellate court.
111. See id. at 201 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, §21,
cmt. D. "The stronger the mark, the greater the protection it receives because the
greater the likelihood that consumers will confuse the junior user's use with that of the
senior user." [d.
112. Elvis, 141 F.3d at 201.
113. See id. The ~urt felt that these arguments were better addressed in the other
factors of confusion. The court was still not convinced that EPE's marks lacked
distinctiveness or that Capece's mark had a different meaning. See id.
114. See id. The court addressed this argument when it considered the similarity
of the two marks. The court observed that the defendants' advertising practices had
"imbued 'The Velvet Elvis' mark with a meaning that directly evokes Elvis Presley,
despite any independent meaning the mark might have." Id.
115. See id. at 201-202 (citing Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d, 1482,
1484 (lOth Cir. 1987». In Jord.ache, the court compared the similarity between two
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Viewed in light of the Velvet Elvis's advertising practices, the
court found the marks confusingly similar, thus causing a likelihood of confusion. 116 As an example, the court noted that the
Velvet Elvis' advertisements referred to Graceland and displayed the "Elvis" portion of the mark boldly with an almost
unnoticeable "Velvet" appearing alongside in smaller script. ll7
The court concluded that the similarity factor weighed in favor
of a likelihood of confusion because Capece used the mark outside the context in which the purchasing public would recognize the service mark as a parody. 118
The third factor the court considered was the similarity of
products and services. 119 This factor allows a trademark owner
to naturally expand the bounds of his or her business into related areas by preventing others' use of the same or similar
marks in those related areas. 120 Although the court recognized
that EPE had recently opened a nightclub in Memphis as part
of a possible worldwide chain, the court stated that the proper
focus of this analysis involved two factors: first, whether the
products and services of EPE and Capece were similar enough
to cause confusion as to source or affiliation; and second,
whether Capece's bar was in a market into which EPE might
naturally expand. 121 Because EPE's marks were within the en-

trademarks for blue jeans by determining their similarity in appearance, sound and
meaning. See Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1484.
116. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 202. The advertisements were seen outside the parodic
context of the bar itself, thus creating the likelihood of confusion as to affiliation with
EPE. See id.
117. See id. The advertisements made no attempt to explain or convey the parody;
they only emphasized connections with Elvis Presley's name and likeness. See id.
118. See id. The court found the advertisements deliberately linked themselves to
Elvis Presley, and did not emphasize the faddish art style that could have been
emphasized. See id.
119. See id. at 202-203.
120. See id. at 202. The court, citing Professional Golfers Ass'n of Am. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 669-670 (5th Cir. 1975), noted that direct competition
between the parties' services does not have to exist to create a likelihood of confusion
between two marks. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 202.
121. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 202-203. The court cited Armco, Inc., v. Armco Burglar
Alarm Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 1155, 1161 (5th Cir. 1982), which held: "Diversification
makes it more likely that a potential customer would associate the non-diversified
company's services with the diversified company, even though the two companies do
not actually compete." Elvis, 141 F.3d at 202-203. The Elvis court warned that the
fact that EPE had since opened a nightclub in Memphis was not the focus of the
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tertainment industry and EPE already owned a wide diversity
of marks for many types of merchandise, the court concluded
the two marks' products and services were confusingly similar.l22 The court also found that EPE might naturally expand
into the cafe and tavern market, similar to a Hard Rock Cafe or
Planet Hollywood type of restaurant. l23 Therefore, the court
held there was a similarity between the two marks' product!;!
and services that weighed in favor of a likelihood of confusion. 124
Fourth, the court reviewed whether Capece intended to confuse the public. l25 The court noted that a good-faith intent to
parody is not an intent to confuse; in such a case, intent merely
becomes irrelevant. 126 However, the court found that Capece's
advertising practices supported an intent to confuse the public
because the club's advertising practices used the superstar's
worldwide, instantaneous fame to draw customers to the bar by
emphasizing "Elvis" and associations with Elvis Presley's likeness. l27 These advertisements used Elvis's name, likeness and
image, emphasized the word "Elvis" in the mark, and named
menu items and happy hours after items and songs directly

matter. Rather, the proper focus was whether the parties' products and services were
similar enough to cause confusion and whether Capece's current market was one of
natural expansion for EPE. See id. at 203.

122. See id.
123. See id. at 202 (citing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, §
21(e) and cmt. j). The Restatement warns that there is a danger of affIliation or
sponsorship confusion when a junior user's services are in a market that is a natural
expansion for the senior user. The court expanded on the similarities: EPE owned
marks for merchandise including t·shirts, juke boxes, hats, and other memorabilia; The
Velvet Elvis likewise sold t·shirts and hats. EPE operated family-oriented restaurants
and ice cream parlors; The Velvet Elvis served food, alcohol, cigars and had live music.
The court then noted that they need not reach a decision on whether there were enough
similarities between the products and services themselves because the caf6 market was
a natural area of expansion for EPE. See id. at 202·203.
124. See id. at 203.
125. See id. The court observed that proof of intent is not necessary to a finding of
a likelihood of confusion. See id.
126. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 203.
127. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 22 cmt. c).
The court found that these practices increased the risk of confusion and were more
than merely "a failure to take reasonable steps to minimize the risk of confusion."
Elvis, 141 F.3d at 203.
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associated with Elvis. 128 This evidence led the court to conclude
that Capece's intent weighed in favor of a likelihood of confusion. l29
The fifth and final factor the court addressed was actual
confusion as to origin, sponsorship or affiliation of the service. l30 Once a customer is lured into the bar by the Elvis theme,
actual confusion results regarding the connection between EPE
and the nightclub. 131 To prove confusion actually occurred in
this case, EPE presented three witnesses at the trial who testified that they were offended, but not confused, by the bar's decor when provided with an opportunity to visit the bar on the
day before the trial. 132 A fourth witness testified he actually
visited the bar to buy Elvis Presley merchandise, realized the
bar was not associated with EPE, but nevertheless stayed and
purchased a drink. l33 Additionally, The Velvet Elvis sometimes
charged a cover charge for entry, and the court found this cover
charge allowed Capece to benefit from this customer's initialinterest confusion. l34 Although the district court found the four

128. See id. The court also drew from the district court's fmdings regarding
Capece's intent to confuse the public through the advertisements. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 203-204. Although actual confusion is not necessary to a finding of
likelihood of confusion, it is the best evidence of a likelihood of confusion. See id.
131. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 204. However, a sale does not have to be concluded for
infringement to occur. This is called initial-interest confusion, which benefits the
lesser-known trademark user in the early stages of a transaction. See id.
132. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 796. Three of the four witnesses called upon to
testify against Capece were Elvis Presley fan club members ranging in age from midforties to early seventies. Each of them had visited Graceland between five and fifty
times. The women were shown photos of the bar a month before trial, and had the
opportunity to visit the bar on the day prior to the trial. All three women were
offended by the bar's decor and testified that such decorations should not be hung in
the same establishment with Elvis Presley memorabilia. The fourth witness was a
gentleman who had been to both bars. When he visited .the original bar, he initially
thought he might be able to buy some Elvis merchandise. He quickly realized once he
entered the nightclub that it had no aftUiation with Elvis Presley. There were no
customer complaints or other instances of confusion other than this four-person survey
performed by EPE prior to trial. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 204. The court explained, "initial-interest confusion
gives the junior user credibility during the early stages of a transaction and can
possibly bar the senior user from consideration by the consumer once the confusion is
dissipated." Id. The court observed in a footnote that the witness who actually went to
the bar and was initially confused stayed and purchased a beer. See id. at 204, n.7.
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witnesses' testimony unconvincing, the appellate court found
the testimony provided a sufficient showing of actual confusion. lM
The court concluded that all five factors it considered in its
de novo review weighed in favor of a likelihood of confusion. 136
The court stated that in considering the service mark as a
whole, including Capece's advertising practices, customers
would very likely be confused over the relationship between the
Velvet Elvis mark and EPE's marks. 137 Therefore, the court
held that Capece's Velvet Elvis mark infringed EPE's marks. 138
D.

DEFENSES AsSERTED BY CAPECE

The court then considered Capece's defense of laches,
claiming that EPE's delay in asserting trademark infringement
was inexcusable. 139 The court determined the relevant time for
application of laches was eight months - from December 1992,
when the mark was published in the Patent and Trademark
Office Official Gazette for opposition, until July 1993 when the
first location closed. 140 The court concluded that Capece suffered no undue prejudice as a result of this delay, and denied
relief on this theory because Capece conceded he did not purchase the signs for the second location until after he received
the cease and desist letter from EPE.141

135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 204-205.
139. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 205 (quoting Conan Properties, Inc., v. Conans Pizza,
Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 153 (5th Cir. 1985)). The court defined laches as an inexcusable
delay in asserting a right or claim, resulting in prejudice to the defendant. See Elvis,
141 F.3d at 205.
140. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 205. EPE knew of Capece's use of the Velvet Elvis mark
when the mark was published in the Patent and Trademark Office's Official Gazette in
December, 1992. The court did not state an opinion as to why EPE did not object to the
mark at that time, nor did it factor that situation into its !ietermination on the
defenses. See id.
141. See id. at 205-206.
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The court then considered Capece's acquiescence defense. 142
The court determined that EPE gave no assurances other than
its silence that it acquiesced to Capece's use of the Velvet Elvis
mark, and that eight months of silence did not rise to a level of
reasonable reliance by Capece to justify the acquiescence defense. l43 Thus, the court concluded that this defense was inadequate to persuade the court to excuse Capece's infringing
activities. 144

E.

ELVIS PRESLEY ENTERPRISES' REMEDIES

Because EPE failed to request an accounting of profits, the
court did not award damages for Capece's infringement. 145 Additionally, when evaluating possible remedies for the other appeals, the court noted that EPE did not properly preserve
available remedies for its trademark dilution and right of publicity claims in the district COurt. 146 Therefore, because the appellate court could provide no further remedy than that provided in the trademark infringement claim, it did not rule on
the trademark dilution or right of publicity claims. 147
Because Capece infringed EPE's marks, the court permanently enjoined Capece from using the Velvet Elvis mark. 148
The court found that enjoining only the infringing activities
that associated the bar with Elvis Presley would not provide

142. See id. at 206 (citing Conan, 752 F.2d at 153). The Conan court defined
acquiescence as the plaintiffs implicit or explicit assurance to the defendant that these
claims or rights will not be asserted, which induces reliance by the defendant. See
Conan, 752 F.2d at 153.
143. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 206. The court determined that the period of silence
relevant to assert of Capece's acquiescence defense would not include any time after
the cease and desist letter was sent to Capece because the letter explicitly
communicated EPE's objection to Capece's use of the mark. The court also stated that
the period of silence while Capece's bar was not open did not constitute acquiescence
because no infringing activity was taking place during that time. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. EPE did not mention its claims for an accounting of profits in the
pretrial order. Therefore, this remedy was considered waived by a narrowing of the
issues prior to trial. See id.
146. See id. EPE did not cite the Texas statute required for an award of attorneys'
fees. Therefore, this remedy was also waived. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 206-207.·
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EPE full and proper relief because Capece's advertising practices had by this time "imbued 'The Velvet Elvis' mark with a
meaning directly related to Elvis Presley, which cannot now be
erased by altering the context of the mark's use. "149 Therefore,
the court reversed and remanded the case to the district court
to enter judgment for EPE. 150

VI.

CRITIQUE

Although the outcome of this case could have been decided
on the Velvet Elvis' confusing advertising practices alone, the
court established an overly restrictive precedent regarding the
treatment of parody in trademark law. 151 The Fifth Circuit now
considers parody as an additional factor in the likelihood of
confusion test only if the parody's purpose is to criticize or
make fun of the original trademark. Because the court adopted
this stringent interpretation of parody, Capece's mark was denied consideration as a parody of the sixties lifestyle and idols
such as Elvis Presley.
A

THE FIFl'H CmCUIT CREATED AMBIGUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF PARODY TO TRADEMARK LAw BY COMBINING

COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

ANALYSES

TO

DETERMINE

The Fifth Circuit established a two-step analysis for the application of parody to trademark law that combined the doctrines of copyright and trademark law. First, the court looked
at the fair use defense of copyright law to determine whether
the parody qualified as a fair use under Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 152, which allows a

149. Id. at 207, n.ll. The court noted that it had stated no opinion as to whether
the mark "The Velvet Elvis' would have infringed EPE's marks if it had not been used
in ways to connote Elvis Presley. See id.
150. See id at 207.
151. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 207, n.ll (5th Cir.
1998). If The Velvet Elvis' advertising practices had not been confusing, the court may
even have allowed Capece's continued use of the service mark. The court mentioned
this possibility in a footnote but declined to address it, stating that this was not the
question before the court. See id.
152. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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parodist to escape copyright infringement liability only if the
target of a parody was the original work from which the parodist borrowed material. l53 Under Justice Kennedy's approach,
no parodist could use any famous name in conjunction with his
work unless the sole target of the parody is the original work
itself.l54 By adopting this extremely narrow interpretation of
fair use, the Fifth Circuit essentially ruled that unless the sole
target of the parody is the original work itself, the parody will
not be classified as a parody at all. 155
Second, the court analyzed the marks under the traditional
likelihood of confusion test.loo However, the court did not consider parody as an additional factor in its analysis because the
Velvet Elvis mark did not meet the fIrst step of the court's fair
use analysis. 157 Even though Capece intended the bar to be a
parody, the court considered this irrelevant in the likelihood of
confusion test because the parody's sole target was not Elvis
Presley.l58 Without the latitude to consider an allegedly infringing mark as a parody, few parodies would ever survive the
153. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 199 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569,597 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Under Justice Kennedy's approach, parody
would essentially be considered infringement per se. Unless the sole target of the
parody were the subject ofthe material from which the parodist borrowed, the parodist
would be subject to copyright infringement. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Likewise, by adopting this approach, the Fifth Circuit has made just as
difficult a position for the parodist in the trademark context. See Elvl~s, 141 F.3d at
199.
154. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597. In contrast, the majority of the Court in
Campbell stated that a parody does not have to squarely target the original work if the
parody does not result in market substitution for the original work. Justice Souter
noted market substitution occurs when the purchaser would tend to purchase the
parody over the original work merely because of the similarity of the products. In such
a situation, infringement has occurred. However, if purchasers are buying the parody
based on their acceptance of the parody's criticism itself, fatal criticism that harms the
market demand for a product does not constitute infringement. See id. at 580.
155. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 199. The Fifth Circuit ignored the parody factor
altogether in its likelihood of confusion analysis, thus providing no latitude for a
parodist to make his or her intended comment. See id.
156. See id. at 200-204.
157. See id. at 199. Because Capece's service mark failed the fIrst step of the
analysis, the mark was not considered in light of the parody in which it was intended.
See id.
158. See id. The Velvet Elvis was treated as a simple infringement case. Although
the court was correct in viewing the mark together with the bar's advertising practices,
the court should have given consideration to the mark and its advertising practices as
a parody rather than as a subsequent trademark that copied a prior trademark. See id.
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Fifth Circuit's strict analysis. 169 Not surprisingly, the Velvet
Elvis mark fell victim to this restrictive interpretation of parody's fair use in trademark law. ISO

B.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE USED THE

APPROACHES SET FORTH IN THE SECOND AND TENTH CIRCUITS
TO DETERMINE WHETHER A PARODY INFRINGES ANOTHER
TRADEMARK

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has long recognized that parody is a form of artistic expression
entitled to protection under the First Amendment. 161 In Cliffs
Notes, Inc. v. Bantan Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 162
the court, considering the likelihood of confusion between the
popular study aid, "Cliffs Notes," and Bantam's parody, "Spy
Notes," noted the tension between the two goals of fostering
free speech and protecting a trademark owner's property
rightS. I63 The court explained that trademark protection is not
lost simply because the allegedly infringing use is in connection
with a work of artistic expression. l64 However, to balance the
goals of allowing artistic expression and protecting deception of
the public, the court held that the Lanham Act "should be construed to apply to artistic works only where the public interest
in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest
in free expression."I66
The Cliffs Notes court stated that a successful parody must
convey two simultaneous, yet contradictory messages - that it

159. See Campbell. 510 U.S. at 580 n.14. The majoritY of the Supreme Court in
Campbell would have provided such latitude. as noted by Justice Souter in his footnote
explaining that looser forms of parody would fall within fair use if no market
substitution occurred. See id.
160. See Elvis. 141 F.2d at 207.
161. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, 886 F.2d 490, 493
(2d Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit noted that its decisions have long recognized the
broad scope permitted parody due to First Amendment considerations, and that
"parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom - both as entertainment and as
a form of social and literary criticism." [d.
162. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
163. See id. at 4~5-497.
164. See id.
165. [d.
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is the original, but it is actually a parody of the original. l66 If
the parody only conveys that it is the original, it will be subject
to trademark infringement liability because it confuses the
public. 167 The court analyzed the two marks, "Cliffs Notes" and
"Spy Notes," and found that the humorous differences between
them minimized any likelihood of confusion by the purchasing
public. l68 Accordingly, the court held that no trademark infringement had occurred. 169
The Fifth Circuit would have benefited from a consideration
of the Second Circuit's approach in its analysis. By the Second
Circuit's standards, Capece's criticism on the sixties lifestyle is
an artistic expression meriting First Amendment protection. If
the Fifth Circuit had viewed the Velvet Elvis mark in light of
the goals of protecting artistic expression and minimizing consumer confusion, it may have found that the public was not
unduly confused as to the source, affiliation or sponsorship between the two marks.
Even if the Fifth Circuit had rejected the notion that parody
is a form of artistic expression meriting First Amendment protection, the court should have allowed Capece to prove that the
humorous incongruities between the two marks mitigate any
likelihood of confusion. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit was confronted with a similar situation in
Jordache Enterprises v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd. 170 In Jordache, the
court held that the humorous incongruities between the "Jordache" trademark for blue jeans and the parodic trademark
"Lardashe" for blue jeans for larger women, led consumers to
understand that the parody was not affiliated in any way with
the Jordache company.171 The court easily recognized that a
parodist's intent is not to confuse the public, but to amuse

166. See id. at 494.
167. See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494.
168. See id. at 497.
169. See id. at 497.
170. 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987).
171. See id. at 1488. The court stated,"A parody relies upon a difference from the
original mark, presumably a humorous difference, in order to produce its desired
effect." [d. at 1486.
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them. 172 The Tenth Circuit held that the "Lardashe" mark did
not present a likelihood of confusion as to source, affiliation or
sponsorship with the "Jordache" mark because the humorous
differences between the two marks made it obvious that the
"Lardashe" mark was a parody.173 Likewise, had the Fifth Circuit taken this approach by allowing Capece to show the humorous incongruities between the Velvet Elvis mark and EPE's
marks, the court may have recognized that the likelihood of
confusion was actually minimized by their differences.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Fifth Circuit held that the Velvet Elvis mark infringed
EPE's marks because the nightclub's advertising practices,
service mark and decor, when considered as a whole, caused a
likelihood of confusion as to source, affiliation or sponsorship
between the club and EPE.174 Although the court's decision
regarding the Velvet Elvis's confusing advertising practices
was a correct one, the Fifth Circuit should ultimately reconsider the precedent it set for parody in trademark law. Its current approach leaves no room for a parodist to criticize another's mark unless the satirized mark is the sole target of the
parodist's criticism. By taking such a narrow approach to parody, the Fifth Circuit has in essence quashed any future creation of parodies because few parodies could survive scrutiny
under this strict infringement standard.
Parody is an artistic form of expression protected under the
First Amendment, and as such should be given greater latitude
when being scrutinized for a likelihood of confusion. A creative, well-developed parody that makes obvious its humorous
content will not be confusing, even if the parody is of an era
and not a specific person. This may be demonstrated by a
showing that the incongruities between the two marks not only

172. See id. When considering the intent factor in the likelihood of confusion test,
the court stated, "where a party chooses a mark as a parody of an existing mark, the
intent is not necessarily to confuse the public but rather to amuse." [d. It continued,
"an intent to parody is not an intent to confuse the public." [d.
173. See id. at 1488.
174. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188,204 (5th Cir. 1998).
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prevent a likelihood of confusion, but also make apparent the
fact that the mark is not affiliated with or sponsored by the
targeted trademark owner.
Deborah Wright-
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